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Abstract 
 Discussion has been made concerning pros and cons of the ways of financing public projects 
via either earmarking or general fund based upon a public finance approach.  The paper studies 
the implications of desirability of earmarked and general fund based upon economic stabilization in 
a two-sector growth model.  Regardless of the nature of public goods, earmarked tax contributes 
to aggregate stabilization, while general fund may be destabilizing and cause fluctuations.  The 
underlying mechanism in favor of earmarked taxes against general fund is that general fund creates 
intersectoral externalities and strategic complementarities that is sufficiently large to exert 
endogenously persistent and recurring fluctuations in aggregate activities in the absence of shocks 
to fundamentals.  Earmarked taxing generates only sector-specific externalities that are too small 
to exert local indeterminacy.  In a calibrated version, we compute the level of long-run welfare 
and the results reflect favorably upon the use of earmarked taxing.  
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1. Introduction 
 This paper studies the desirability of earmarked taxing against general fund financing based 
upon the implications of economic stabilization.  Under general fund financing the tax revenues 
from different sources are placed in a general fund, from which different government programs are 
financed.  For example, in the case of national defense, federal taxes from many sources are 
collected and placed within the Treasury, and then Congress spends the amount it deems 
appropriate for national defense without regard to where the revenues were raised.  Alternatively, 
in earmarked taxes the revenues are designated to particular spending activities, thus providing a 
direct link between tax revenues from one source and earmarked expenditure for a particular task.  
For instance, the federal gasoline taxes and motor vehicle fees, airport and air ticket taxes, 
television licensing fees, tolls and hotel room and tourist taxes in some countries are earmarked for 
the activities in the transportation and tourist sector, including the building and maintenance of 
transportation services.  Another example is cigarette taxes, carbon taxes and air pollution fees 
that are earmarked for the activities in the health service and environmental overwatch sector.1  
Coffee taxes in Colombia are a famous example of earmarked taxes.  According to Teja and 
Bracewell-Milnes (1991), a number of taxes are levied on coffee exports.  A considerable 
percentage of the proceeds are earmarked for its price stabilization activities and subsidizing 
domestic coffee consumption.  Thus, earmarked spending is not only in infrastructure but also in 
other aspects.  Even in infrastructure, as this example shows, the infrastructure is built in 
coffee-producing area that is mostly for the use in the coffee industry and little else for other 
industries.  In all of these sectors the tax revenues from a particular source/sector go toward a 
relevant spending destination /sector.2 
 Conventional wisdom provides extensive discussion concerning the pros and cons of 
earmarking and general fund.  Earmarking allows for the median voter to choose which quantities 
of the public goods should be provided at which tax prices, and calls for a simultaneous choice in a 
                                                     
1 See Wagner (1991, p. 110) for gasoline taxes and vehicle fees, Stiglitz (1988, p. 177) for airport and airline 
ticket taxes and tolling, and Bailey (1995, p. 216) for road fuel duties, road fund license fees, television 
licensing fees, hotel bed taxes, cigarette taxes, carbon taxes and air pollution fees. 
 
2 In the U.S., for example, the fraction of earmarked tax in the state tax dropped from 51.4% in 1954 to 
41.1% in 1964, to 23% in 1979 (Wyrick and Arnold, 1989), and to a stable 24% in 2000 (Novarro, 2002).  
In Canada, the fraction of earmarked tax was 36% at the federal level and 25% at the provincial level 
(Hickling Corporation, 1991).  Finally, in Japan, only 20.6% of indirect tax was earmarked for specific 
appropriations of government-provided services in the 1990 fiscal year (Ishi, 2001). 
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level of taxation and expenditure on an item-by-item basis.  A traditional argument for earmarked 
taxes is that earmarking protects high-priority programs from shifting majorities, inefficiency and 
corruption, and entails a very process of budgetary choice which links directly between revenues of 
a particular tax and expenditures for a particular public task.  Moreover, earmarked taxation works 
as a commitment solution solving time-inconsistency problems in tax policy.  Finally, the 
earmarked tax is better able to reflect personal preferences in collective choices and is a mthod of 
channeling the incentives of politicians in socially useful directions.  The argument in favor of 
earmarked taxing began with the classic paper based upon the public finance approach by 
Buchanan (1963), followed by Goetz (1968), Browning (1975) and Marsilliani and Renstrom 
(2000), among others.   
 Alternatively, general fund financing separates choices of taxation from choices of spending, 
and conceptually creates a two-step decision process, with the aggregate taxation level chosen first 
and the distribution of those revenues among expenditure programs decided thereafter.  Some of 
the opponents of earmarked taxes in support of general fund financing maintain that earmarking 
introduces inflexibility and leads to a misallocation of resources (McMahon and Sprenkle, 1972), 
while others argue the erosion of budgetary efficiency (Teja, 1988), the inefficiency under political 
uncertainty (Bret and Keen, 2000), and low internal rates of returns and high distortions (Butler, 
2000).  Recently, Bös (2000) considered the situation where taxing and spending are performed by 
two separate agents in a principal-agent setting and found that earmarking is not optimal and hence  
no longer as desirable as advocated by Buchanan and his followers.    
 This paper argues for the attractiveness of earmarked taxes based upon the implications 
affecting economic stabilization, as a method different from a traditional public finance approach.  
Recently, attention has been paid to economic stabilization in the study of the government policy 
rules.  The stability of a policy means that the underlying policy guarantees a determinate 
equilibrium path, whereas destabilization indicates that the equilibrium path is locally 
indeterminate and there are endogenous, welfare-reducing fluctuations unrelated to economic 
fundamentals.3  To our knowledge this study is the first attempt to evaluate the two tax regimes 
based upon stability properties.  
 Specifically, we set up a standard endogenous growth model with two sectors, where one of 
                                                     
3 There is growing literature that analyzes aggregate economic stability of government policy rules.  See, 
for example, the study of balanced-budget fiscal policy rules by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and of the 
inflation-forecast targeting rule by Benhabib, et al. (2001).  
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the sectors producing pure consumption goods and the other sector producing either pure 
investment goods or composite goods that may be consumed or invested.  There is output taxation 
on both sectors, with provisions of public expenditure in accordance with one of the two fiscal 
regimes.  Public goods under provision may be partly productive and partly consumptive in 
nature.4  In this paper public goods are formulated either as production- or as utility-enhanced.  
 There are various ways of implementing public spending of tax revenues from earmarking 
and general fund tax regimes.  With tax revenues, public spending may be put into service in 
terms of productive public goods, consumptive public goods, transfers or other kinds such as public 
wastes.  We do not choose transfers and public wastes as the ways of public spending.  Our study 
covers only provisions of public goods among ways of public spending for the following reasons.  
Much of public spending is in terms of provisions of public goods.  Provisions of public goods, 
either in terms productive or consumptive public goods, are often seen in existing two-sector 
growth models.  Moreover, our choice may serve as a benchmark for further analysis in other 
types of public spending.   
 Different destinations of useful public services are distinguished by the activities in different 
sectors in our model.  The general fund financing regime is represented here by output taxation 
from two sectors for public services toward these two sectors, and the earmarked taxing regime 
corresponds to output taxation in one sector with public spending toward that sector.  Although 
earmarking is a special case of general fund financing, such a feature is not characterized in the 
following analysis.  The main difference between these two regimes is that the allocation of 
resources for earmarking is intra-sector and that for general fund financing is inter-sector.  
Although the configuration may capture only one aspect of the differences about the two regimes in 
practice, such a differentiation is a tradeoff we may need to make in a simple general equilibrium 
model.   
 A brief account of the results is as follows.  While earmarked taxing contributes to aggregate 
stabilization, general fund financing may generate endogenously persistent and recurring 
fluctuations unrelated to economic fundamentals.  The argument against the general fund 
financing is the presence of intersectoral resource reallocation resulted from the provisions of 
public goods to one sector using resources from the other sector.  The intersectoral externality 
                                                     
4 Recent studies concerning public goods such as Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Chen 
(2003) have adopted the production specification, while other studies like Cazzavillan (1996), Bianconi and 
Turnovsky (1997) and Devereux and Wen (1998) have used the utility strategy.  Chen (2006) used both 
types of specification. 
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generates strategic complementarities between sectors that are so large that self-fulfilling 
prophecies emerge driving the economy either to experience rapid capital accumulation and high 
growth or to suffer from slow capital accumulation and low growth.  In both the cases of 
production- and utility-enhanced public goods, local indeterminacy is established if the degree of 
intersectoral externality exceeds a threshold.  Earmarked taxing creates a sector-specific 
externality, but the externality here is not large enough to exert local indeterminacy. 
 Dynamic stability has been one of the popular research topics in a general equilibrium, 
two-sector model.  The contribution of our study to this type of a two-sector setup lies in 
comparisons of the dynamic stability properties in two popular tax regimes.  In particular, our 
study finds that an intersectoral externality may arise easily from a particular fiscal regime that is 
emerged not only in production-related but also in consumption-related public good provisions.5  
Existing literature has paid no attentions to the source of dynamic instabilities in association with 
particular types of tax regimes.  Moreover, in a calibrated version of the model, we also compute 
the long-run welfare in these two tax regimes.  We find the level of welfare in an earmarked tax is 
higher than the level of welfare in a general-fund tax.  Therefore, this paper provides support in 
favor of earmarked taxing against general fund financing based on both aggregate stabilization in 
transitional dynamics and the level of welfare in the long run.            
 Section 2 below studies the model with production enhanced public goods, and Section 3 
investigates the model with utility enhanced public goods.  Section 4 calibrates the model and 
compares the level of welfare in the long run.  Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 2.  Production Enhancing Public Goods 
 The economy consists of households, firms and the government, with two sectors that are 
competitive and for convenience, are called Sectors X and Y.  Capital is the only private input in 
both sectors, but it may be thought of as a composite of physical and human capital (e.g., Rebelo, 
1991).  There is a continuum of infinitely lived, representative agent whose measure is normalized 
to unity.  There is a representative firm, endowed with an Ak-type technology, the simplest 
technology in consistency with perpetual growth.   
                                                     
5 In addition to externality, local indeterminacy may also arise from distortionary factor taxation with two 
sectors (Bond, et al., 1996), from the presence of increasing returns with one sector (Farmer and Guo, 1994) 
and trade (Nishimura and Shimomura, 2002).  See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for a survey of the 
literature. 
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 The production in both sectors is externally enhanced by public services in the fashion in 
Barro (1990) and others.  Following the two-sector setup in Boldrin and Rusticini (1994) and 
Drugeon, et al. (2003), Sector X is pure consumption goods and Sector Y is pure investment goods.6  
The technologies in both sectors are 
  1( ) , 0 1,XX sK G
α α α−= < <     (1a) 
  1[(1 ) ] , 0 1,YY a s K G
β β β−= − < <  (1b) 
where a is the productivity coefficient in Sector Y, s is the fraction of capital K allocated to Sector 
X, and GX and GY are the provisions of public goods toward Sectors X and Y, with α and β their 
contribution to the production, respectively. 
 The government levies output taxes in both sectors with a tax rate, τ.7  Let TX and TY be the 
tax revenues in Sectors X and Y.  Then, 
   TX=τX,  TY=τY. (2) 
 The household budget constraints are 
  (1 ) ,C Xτ= −  (3a) 
    (1 ) , (0) given,K Y K Kτ δ= − −&  (3b) 
where C is the consumption and δ is the depreciation rate of capital.  
 The representative agent is assumed to possess a discounted lifetime utility, with a felicity 
exhibiting a constant, intertemporal elasticity of substitution as follows. 
                      1 110 ,
t Ce dtσρ σ
−∞ − −
−∫  σ≥0, ρ>0,                           (4) 
where σ is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ρ is the discount rate. 
 The fiscal system is classified into general fund financing and earmarking.  Different 
activities in our model are distinguished by sectors.  The general fund financing is formalized by 
output taxation from two sectors for spending toward these two sectors.  The earmarked tax is 
formalized by output taxation in one sector for expenditure on public services in that sector.   
                                                     
6 See also Benhabib and Farmer (1996), Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), Harrison (2001), Weder (2001), 
Benhabib, et al. (2002) and Nishimura and Venditti (2002), among others.   
 
7 Although a fraction of the government’s revenue may be from consumption, the assumption of output tax is 
innocuous.  To allow for a consumption tax in our model, two consumption goods are necessary.  In the 
environment with two consumption goods in Section 3 below, if the output taxation is replaced by a 
consumption tax, the underlying dynamic structure is the same and the results remain unchanged.  We thus 
maintain the taxation of output throughout the paper.   Literature concerning he output taxation in an 
endogenous growth model starts from Barro (1990) and Rebelo (1991).    
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 We assume that the government divides the taxes from each sector’s resource into two parts 
as follows.   
  TX=uTX+(1−u)TX, (5a) 
  TY=vTY+(1−v)TY, (5b) 
where u∈(0, 1) and v∈(0, 1), determined by the government, are the fraction of tax on Sectors X 
and Y, respectively, allocated to the provision of one kind of public service.    
 The taxes are then used to provide public services.  To distinguish the two regimes, we need 
a general technology of the public goods provision.  Moreover, in order to be consistent with 
sustainable growth, the technology must be of constant returns.  In line with the Cobb-Douglas 
form in (1a) and (1b), we formalize the technologies of public good provision as follows.   
  11 2 ,X X XG G G
θ θ−=  (6a) 
  11 2 ,Y Y YG G G
η η−=  (6b) 
where GX1 and GX2  (resp. GY1 and GY2) stand for the two inputs employed by the government in 
order to provide public services toward Sector X (resp. Y), and θ and 1−θ (resp. η and 1−η) 
represent the contribution of inputs toward the provision of public services for Sector X (resp. Y).  
We remark that in (6) it is impossible to directly add up the two inputs when providing public 
services.  The reasons are that if the two inputs come from different sectors, they have different 
shadow prices.   
 Let us remark on the use of private capital in the provision of public services.  The 
consideration of the use of private capital in the production of public inputs will not change the 
main insights but the algebra becomes much more complicated.  To see why, we may denote χ as 
the faction of private capital that goes to the public sector and thus, 1-χ, the remaining fraction to 
the private sector.  For the former fraction χ, if fraction ω is used in the production of GX, then 1-ω 
is in the production of GY.  Then, χ and ω are two new variables and are control variables.  While 
χ is determined by equalizing the marginal products between private goods and public goods, ω is 
determined by equalizing the marginal products between two public goods.  In equilibrium 
conditions, we may express χ and ω as functions of s: χ=χ(s)and ω =ω(s).  As will be seen below, 
the dynamic system is summarized by the single variable s.  If private capital is used in the 
provisions of public services, the dynamic system in s is more complicated as it involves χ=χ(s) and 
ω =ω(s).  Yet, other than making the dynamic equation more complicated, this will not change the 
results as it is the degree of intersectoral externality that is produced by a general-fund tax and 
drives aggregate destabilization.  
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 Since the taxes are divided into four parts and there are two kinds of public good provisions, 
there is a total of six ways in the combinations of resources into inputs.  Among the six types of 
combination, only one type can be used to capture the earmarking regime:  tax sources from 
Sector X (resp. Y) are used to provide public services toward Sector X (resp. Y).  Specifically, 
earmarking is represented by8  
  1 2, (1 ) ;X X X XG uT G u T= = −  (7a) 
  1 2;  (1 ) .Y Y Y YG vT G v T= = −  (7b) 
but general fund financing is described by the other five combinations.  Without loss of generality, 
we only examine the following benchmark case:  
  1 2,  ;X X X YG uT G vT= =  (8a) 
  1 2(1 ) ,  (1 ) .Y X Y YG u T G v T= − = −  (8b) 
The main difference between these two regimes is that the allocation of resources for earmarking is 
intra-sector but that for general fund financing is inter-sector.   
 It is easy to see adding up conditions for public inputs.  In earmarked taxes, equations (5a) 
and (7a) yields 1 2 ,X X XG G T Xτ+ = =  and equations (5b) and (7b) lead to 1 2 .Y Y YG G T Yτ+ = =   
In a general-fund regime, (5a) and (8a) generate 1 1 ,X Y XG G T Xτ+ = =  and (5b) and (8b) give rise 
to 2 2 .X Y YG G T Yτ+ = =  
 Given K(0), τ, u, v, and public goods, the representative agent’s problem is to choose C, s and 
K in order to maximize its discounted utility in (4), subject to the constraints in (3a-b) and (1a-b).  
If we let λ(t) be the co-state variable associated with K(t), then the necessary conditions are  
 1(1 ) (1 ) ,
X Y
s sC
σα λ β− −− = −  (9a) 
 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) [(1 ) ] ,X YK KC
τ τσα λ β δ λρ λ− −−− + − − = − &  (9b) 
and the transversality condition lim 0.tt e K
ρ λ−→∞ =    
 While (9a) equates the marginal product of capital between the consumption and the 
investment sector, (9b) is the Euler equation for capital.  
   We are ready to evaluate the stabilization properties in each tax regime.  We start with an 
earmarked taxing regime, followed by a general fund financing regime. 
2.1 Earmarking Taxes  
                                                     
8 In this presentation, earmarking regime is reduced to GX=TX and GY=TY when θ=η=1/2.  
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 The equilibrium conditions include (1a-b), (2), (3a-b), (6a-b), (7a-b) and (9a-b) that determine 
TX, TY, X, Y, GX, GY, GX1, GX2, GY1, GY2, C, ,K&  s and λ.  To analyze the equilibrium, we transform 
non-stationary into stationary variables, and eventually summarize the dynamic system in one 
equation.   
 First, let p denote the shadow price of the investment good in terms of the consumption good.  
If we use (9a), together (1a-b), (2), (6a-b), and (7a-b), we obtain 
  
1
1 1 1 111 11
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] .p C a u u v v
β βααβ β α βασ θ θ θ θαβλ τ− − − −−− − −− −−−≡ = − −  (10) 
 Then, using (9a-b), with (1b), (2), (6a-b), and (7a-b), yields a relationship for .λλ
&   Moreover, 
we use (1b) and (3b) to obtain an expression for .KK
&   Finally, if we substitute (1a) and (3a) into 
(10) and then differentiate, with the use of relationships λλ
&  and ,KK
&  we obtain 
  { }1( 1) (1 ) [(1 ) (1 )] ( ),ss s sσ σ δ ρ τ φ β σ= − − + − − − − ≡ Θ&  (11) 
where 
1
1(1 )
1 { [ (1 ) ] } .a v v βη η βφ τ −−≡ −   
 Equation (11) is a first-order differential equation in the fraction of capital allocated to the 
consumption good sector and summarizes the dynamics of the economy in equilibrium.  Once the 
equation determines s, other variables are determined by substituting s into the other equations.  
 A steady-state equilibrium is a Balanced Growth Path (BGP) when 0.s =&   It is evident that 
there exists a unique BGP at 
1
( 1)1*
(1 )1 .s
σ δ ρβ
σ σφ τ
− −−
−= − −   The BGP is interior when 0<s*<1, which is 
so if 1 10 (1 )(1 ) [ (1 ) ].β τ φ δ ρ σ φ τ δ< − − − − < − −   The condition is standard in an endogenous 
growth model:  while the first inequality requires high productivity in order for positive growth in 
a BGP, the second inequality demands a bound on productivity in order to meet the transversality 
condition. 
 As s is a control variable that adjusts instantaneously, a BGP is a saddle if the eigenvalue has 
a positive real part and thus the equilibrium trajectory in the neighborhood of the BGP diverges 
from the BGP.  The BGP is a sink if the eigenvalue has a negative real part and thus the 
equilibrium trajectory in the neighborhood of the BGP converges to the BGP.  As ( )s s= Θ& is 
increasing in s, the eigenvalue has a positive real part.  Therefore, the BGP is a saddle and thus the 
equilibrium path toward the BGP is unique. 
 
2.2 General Fund Financing Taxes 
In this regime, the only difference is the composition of public services that is summarized in 
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(8a-b).  Denote 1 ,α αθ≡ 2 (1 ),α α θ≡ − 1 ,β βη= and 2 (1 ),β β η≡ −  where α2 and β1 represent 
the intersectoral externality in Sectors X and Y, respectively.9  
To analyze the equilibrium, we use (9a), with (2), (6a-b), (8a-b), and (1a-b), to obtain 
  
[ (1 ) (1 )]2 1
1 2
2
(1 )
(1 ) ( ) ,1
sp C
s
α β β α
φασ
βλ
− − + −− Φ
− Φ≡ = −  (12) 
where  
1
1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2(1 ) (1 ) 1
1 { ( ) [(1 ) (1 ) ] } ,u v u v
φα β α β α α β β β ατ − + + −Φ = − −   
1
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1
2 { ( ) [(1 ) (1 ) ] } ,a u v u v
φα β α β α α α β β β ατ− + + − −Φ = − −  
  2 2 1 2 1(1 )(1 ) 0.φ β α α β= − − − >  
 If we employ the relationship ,λλ
&  derived based on (1a-b), (2), (6a-b), (8a-b), and (9a-b), and 
the relationship ,KK
&  resulted from (1b), (2), (3b), (6a-b), and (8a-b), then the substitution of (3a) 
into (12) and differentiation leads to the following equation summarizing the dynamics in 
equilibrium. 
  ( ) ( ) ( ),s M s s s= Δ ≡ Λ&  (13) 
where  2
2 1 2
(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) ( 1) (1 )( ) ,
s s
sM s
φ
σφ β α σ α β
−
− + − − − −≡  
       
(1 )1
2
2 1( ) ( 1) (1 ) ( ) [ (1 ) (1 )].
s
ss s
β α
φσ δ ρ τ σ β−−Δ ≡ − − − − Φ − − −  
 The feasibility demands M(s)<∞, which implies a threshold 2 1
2
( 1) (1 ) (1 )ˆ 1s σ α β β ασφ
− − − −≡ −  such 
that ˆ.s s≠   Note that M(0)=M(1)=0, and M(s)>(resp. <)0 if ˆ( . ) .s resp s< >   Once s is 
determined from (13), we can determine other variables. 
 The BGP is determined when 0,s =&  which is 
  
(1 )1
2
2 1( 1) (1 ) ( ) [ (1 ) (1 )].
s
s s
β α
φσ δ ρ τ σ β−−− − = − Φ − − −  (14) 
 It is obvious that the left-hand side of (14), denoted as L, is a constant.  The right-hand side 
of (14), denoted as R(s), is zero at both s=0 and 1 (1 ) / ,s s β σ= ≡ − −  with 0 1s< <  if  
1 .σ β> −  Thus, R(s) has a humped shape with a positive (negative) value for all ( )s s< >  and 
approaching to negative infinity as s is close to 1 (Figure 1).10   
                                                     
9Together (6a-b) and (8a-b), the production functions (1a) and (1b) are 1 (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) ,X YX sK uT vT
α αθ α θ− −=  and 
1 (1 )[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] .X YY s K u T v T
β βη β η− −= − − −       
 
10 Alternatively, if σ<1−β, the R(s) is zero only at s=0, with the value being negative and decreasing in s and 
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 It is easy to see that a unique BGP emerges if L≡(σ−1)δ−ρ<0, while there are two BGPs if 
L≡(σ−1)δ−ρ<0 and the following condition is met,11 
 
Condition A. 
(1 ) (1 )1 1
1 1
1
2( 1)[(1 ) (1 ) ] .
β α β α
φ φσ τ β β δ ρ− −−− − Φ − − >  
 
 The proof of dynamic stability is in Appendix A.  In the case with a unique BGP, dynamic 
stability is as demonstrated in Figure 2.  We have shown in Appendix A that the unique BGP s* is 
a sink and thus equilibrium path toward it is indeterminate if the following condition is met, 
2 max{ , }α α α> )%  
where 
*
1 2 1 1
*
1 1
(1 ) (1 )(1 )[1 ( )]
( 1)(1 ) [1 ( )]
s
s
β α σ β α β
σ β σβ βα − + − − −− − + −≡%  and 1 1 1(1 )( 1)(1 ) .a β ασ β β−− − +≡
)  
 This condition says that given β1, i.e., the degree of intersectoral externalities in Sector Y, the 
unique BGP is a sink if the degree of intersectoral externalities in Sector X is above a minimal 
level.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 In the case with two BGPs, dynamic stability is as illustrated in Figures 3-5, where the two 
BGPs being s1* and s2*, with s1*<s2*.  Figure 3 is when *2 ˆ,s s<  and in this circumstance it is 
evident that ( )s s= Λ&  is negatively (resp. positively) sloping at s1* (resp. s2*).  Therefore, while 
BGP s2* is a saddle, BGP s1* is a sink. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 Alternatively, for *2 ˆ,s s>  two situations emerge depending on if s1* is larger or smaller than 
ˆ.s   In Figures 4 and 5, BGP s2* is always a sink, as ( )s s= Λ&  is always negatively sloping around 
s2*.  BGP s1* is a saddle in Figure 5 as ( )s s= Λ&  is positively sloping at s1*; however, s1* is a sink 
in Figure 4 as ( )s s= Λ&  is negatively sloping at s1*, like that in Figure 3.   
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 here] 
                                                                                                                                                                 
approaching to negative infinity as s is close to 1.  In general σ≥1, this case is less interesting. 
   
11 Let 22 1 2 1 2 1
2
{[ (1 )] [ (1 )] 4 (1 )[1 (1 ) / ]}
2 .s
φ β α φ β α φ β α β σ
φ
+ − − + − − − − −≡%  Then, ( )R s%  is the maximal value.  It is obvious that 
(1 ) (1 )1 1
1 1
1
2( ) ( ) (1 ) ( 1) (1 ) .R s R
β α β α
φ φβ τ σ β β− −−> = − Φ − −%   Two BGPs are obtained if ( ).L R s≤ %  It suffices to 
require ( ),L R β≤  from which Condition A is obtained. 
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 To summarize the above results,  
   
Proposition 1.  Suppose the public goods are productive.  Then, 
(i)  when the tax is earmarked, the equilibrium path toward the BGP is unique and determinate; 
(ii)  when the fiscal regime is governed by general fund financing, the equilibrium path toward 
at least one BGP is destabilized if, given the degree of intersectoral externalities in the 
investment good sector, the degree of intersectoral externalities in the consumption good 
sector is above a level. 
 
 To close this section, we note that earmarked spending may exert intersectoral externalities if 
GX=GY=G.  We argue that this situation may not emerge for two reasons.  First, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain the condition GX= GY.  The reason is that, even with an equal share of tax 
revenues from each sector of X and Y allocated to GJK, J=X, Y, K=1, 2, X=Y is required in order to 
obtain GX= GY.  Generically, it is rarely for two different sectors to produce the same amount of 
output.  Moreover, even if GX= GY=G is possible, there is insufficient intersectoral externalities to 
trigger equilibrium indeterminacy as earmarked spending in one sector may only have a minor 
effect on the other sector.  This is so as earmarked public spending is also in aspects other than 
infrastructure and in the case of infrastructure; it may not be shared with other sectors.  In the 
example of earmarked taxes with respect to coffee taxes in Colombia (Teja and Bracewell-Milnes, 
1991), earmarked taxes are spent mostly in the area of coffee price stabilization activities and 
subsidizing domestic coffee consumption.  Even in infrastructure in the coffee-producing area, the 
infrastructure is mainly used by the coffee industry.  In this case, there are only minor intersectoral 
externalities, if any, whose magnitude is below the threshold and thus cannot trigger equilibrium 
indeterminacy.   
   
3.  Utility Enhanced Public Goods 
 Suppose now that public goods are consumptive and enhance the agent’s felicity.  We need 
two kinds of consumption goods in order for public services to enhance consumption in both 
sectors.  Thus, while the commodity in Sector X is still a pure consumption good, the commodity 
in Sector Y is now modified as a composite good that may be either consumed or accumulated as 
capital stock.  As there are no productive public goods now, the technologies in (1a)-(1b) are 
modified as X sK=  and (1 ) .Y a s K= −  Denote CX and CY the consumption of goods X and Y, 
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respectively.  Now the budget constraints in (3a-b) become 
  (1 ) ,XC Xτ= −                      (15a) 
  (1 ) , (0) given,YK Y K C Kτ δ= − − −&  (15b) 
while the felicity in (4) is modified as  
 { }1 1 2 21 21 11 11 10 [( ) 1] [( ) 1] ,t X X Y Ye C G C G dtγ σ γ σρ σ σ∞ − −− − −− + −∫  ρ>0, σi≥0, γ1>0 and γ2>0,    (16) 
where the government budget constraint (5) or (6) is satisfied.  
 To be consistent with a BGP, it is required that σ1+(σ1−1)γ1=σ2+(σ2−1)γ2≡φ3>0 and σ1=σ2, 
denoted as σ hereafter.  The requirement implies γ1=γ2, henceforth denoted asγ.  The condition 
for φ3>0 is 1 ,γγσ +>  which is easily met if σ≥1.  Thus, we impose 
  
Condition B:  γ1=γ2≡γ and σ1=σ2≡σ≥1. 
  
 Given K(0), τ and public goods, the representative agent’s optimization problem is to choose 
CX, CY, s and K in order to maximize (16), subject to constraints (15a-b).  The necessary 
conditions are  
 (1 )1 ,X Xa C G
σ γ σ λ− − =  (17a) 
 (1 ) ,Y YC G
σ γ σ λ− − =  (17b) 
 (1 ) (1 ) [ (1 )(1 ) ] ,X XC G s a s
σ γ σ τ λ τ δ λρ λ− − − + − − − = − &  (17c) 
and the transversality condition lim 0.tt e K
ρ λ−→∞ =   
While the conditions in (17a-b) equalize the marginal utilities of the consumption of goods X 
and Y with the shadow price of capital, (17c) is the Euler equation for capital.  Note that the 
relative price of Y in terms of X is (1 ) .X Xp C G
γ σσλ −≡    
3.1 Earmarking Taxes 
 Substituting (6a-b), (7a-b), and (15a) into (17a) and differentiating, together the relationships 
λλ
&  from (6a-b), (7a-b), (17a) and (17c) and kk
&  from (6a-b), (7a-b), (15b) and (17a-b), yields the 
following equation summarizing the dynamics in equilibrium. 
  ( 1)
3
1
4{ [ (1 ) ] (1 )[ (1 ) ( ) ]} ( ),1
ss s a a s s s
s
γ σ
σφ τ δ ρ δ τ φ
−= − − − + − − − − ≡ Ψ−&  (18) 
where 11 1 ( 1)4 { [ (1 ) (1 ) ] } .a u u v v σθ θ η η γ σφ − − − −= − −  
 In a BGP, 0,s =&  and thus 
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( 1)
3
1
4 1[ (1 ) ] (1 )[ (1 ) ( ) ].
s
sa a s s
γ σ
σφ τ δ ρ δ τ φ
−
−− − − + = − − −               (19) 
 The left-hand side of the above relationship is positive under Condition B.  The right-hand 
side, denoted as RH(s), is RH(0)=a(1−τ)>0 and RH(1)≤0, and is decreasing in s for all s∈(0, 1).12  
Thus, there exists a unique interior BGP s* if (1−τ)>[a(1−τ)−δ−ρ]/φ3+δ, or equivalently if 
a(1−τ)−(δ+ρ)>−ρφ3/(φ3−1).  In particular, the economic growth rate in a BGP is positive if 
a(1−τ)−(δ+ρ)>0.  
 Finally, to investigate local dynamics, ( )s s= Ψ&  is increasing in s under Condition B.  As a 
result, the BGP is always a saddle and thus the equilibrium path toward the BGP is unique.  
     
3.2 General Fund Financing Taxes 
 For analytical simplicity we assume θ+η=1 in (6) so that the total contribution to the 
provisions of public services toward both sectors of a tax source from any one of the two sectors is 
summed to unity.  While this assumption is not necessary; it makes γ1θ=γ2(1−η)≡ε<γ and 
γ1(1−θ)=γ2η≡ψ<γ under Condition B, so that ε now representing the sector-specific externality on 
consumption is simplified to be the same in both sectors and ψ representing the intersectoral 
externality on consumption is also the same in both sectors.   
 Substituting (6a-b), (8a-b), and (16a) into (17a) and differentiating, using the relationships λλ
&  
from (6a-b), (8a-b), (17a) and (17c) and KK
&  from (6a-b), (8a-b), (15b) and (17a-b), leads to the 
following equation summarizing the dynamics in equilibrium. 
  ( ) ( ) ( ),s W s s s= Γ ≡ Π&  (20) 
where (1 )(1 ) ( 1)[( ) ]( ) ,
s s
s sW s σ σ ε ψ ε
−
− − − + −=  
   
( 1)( )
3 5 1( ) (1 ) {(1 )[ (1 ) ( ) ] },
s
ss a a s s
σ ε ψ
στ δ ρ φ τ φ δ− −−Γ ≡ − − − − − − − −  
   
11
5 (1 ) (1 )
( ) 0.u v
v u
a
σε ψσ σ
ε ψφ −− −≡ >    
                                                     
12 { } { }( 1) ( 1)( ) ( 1) (1 )14 41 1 1 (1 )(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) [ (1 ) ( 1)] ( ) ,RH s s ss s s s s sa s s s N sγ σ γ σσ σγ σ τσ στ φ φ σ σ γ σ− −∂ − − −∂ − − − −= − − + + = − + − + − where 
( )N s ≡  ( 1)1( ) .sss
γ σ
σ
−
−   If σ(1−s)+γ(σ−1)≥0, then ( ) 0.RH ss∂ ∂ <   Alternatively, in a less plausible case where 
σ(1−s)+γ(σ−1)<0, we may use 0s =&  to rewrite 
2
1 1
1( ) (1 ) [ (1 ) ].N s s τ φ τ δ ρ δ−= − − − − − +    Then, under 
Condition B, N(s)<(1−s).  That means { } 2(1 )( ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) [ (1 ) ( 1)](1 ) 0RH ss s s ss s s s τ φτσ σσ σ γ σ − −∂ − −∂ −< − + − + − − = <  
under Condition B.  As a consequence, RH(s) is decreasing in s under Condition B. 
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 Feasibility requires W(s)<∞, which implies a threshold ( 1)( 1)( ) 1s
σ σ ε
σ σ ε ψ
+ −
+ − +≡ <(  such that  .s s≠ (  
Note that 1s <(  under Condition B.  It follows that W(s)>(resp. <)0 if ( . ) .s resp s< > (   
 In a BGP, 0,s =&  so (20) leads to 
( 1)( )
3
1
5 1[ (1 ) ] (1 )[ (1 ) ( ) ].
s
sa a s s
σ ε ψ
σφ τ δ ρ δ τ φ
− −
−− − − + = − − −  
 The left-hand side of the above relationship is positive under Condition B.  The right-hand 
side, denoted as RHS(s), is RHS(0)=a(1−τ)>0 and RHS(1)≤0 and is decreasing in s for all s∈(0, 1).  
Thus, there exists a unique interior BGP s*=s*(τ, δ, ρ; ψ) if a(1−τ)−(δ+ρ)>−ρφ3/(φ3−1), with 
* 0sψ∂∂ > if *1 * 1 ,s vs u− −≥  and the economic growth rate is positive if a(1−τ)−(δ+ρ)>0.  
 Finally, to analyze the stabilization we note that Γ(s) is increasing in s.  As a result, if 
W(s)<0, then ( )s s= Π& is decreasing in s and thus the BGP is a sink.   
 The condition for W(s)<0 is * ,s s> ( that implies the prerequisite of * 1 ** 1[ ].ss σσψ ψ ε− −> ≡ +   
The condition thus requires the level of intersectoral externalities above a threshold in order to 
exhibit local indeterminacy, and to make the economy destabilized.   
 To summarize the results in this section, we obtain  
 
Proposition 2.   Suppose that a public good is utility-enhancing and Condition B is met.  Then,   
(i) in the earmarked tax regime the equilibrium path to BGP is always unique and determinate; 
(ii) in the general fund financing regime the equilibrium path toward BGP is indeterminate if the 
 level of intersectoral externalities is above a threshold. 
     
4.  Welfare Analysis 
 This section compares the welfare in both earmarked taxes and general-fund taxes.  As 
shown in Sections 2 and 3, if the level of intersectoral externalities is above a threshold, at least 
one of the BGP is a sink in general-fund taxes.  Then, there is a continuum of equilibrium paths 
toward the BGP that is a sink.  It is impossible to compute the welfare along an infinite number of 
equilibrium paths in general-fund taxes.  Under the circumstances, we may compute the welfare 
along the BGP.   
 Specifically, under given initial states, we can calculate the discounted lifetime utility along 
the BGP.  We calibrate the model economy in consistence with the U.S. economy and then 
quantify the level of discounted lifetime utility.  We start with the economy with production- 
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enhancing public goods, followed by the economy with utility-enhancing public goods.  As will 
be seen, in both economies the level of welfare in earmarked taxes is higher than that in 
general-fund taxes.    
 
4.1 Production Enhancing Public Goods 
 Along the BGP, the discounted lifetime utility in (4) is written as 
  
1
0 1
1 (1 )[ ( 1) ] (1 ) ,
C
gU
σ
σ ρ σ σ ρ
−
− + − −= −   (21) 
where C0 is the initial consumption and g denotes the economic growth rate along the BGP.  
Values of C0 and g are determined by the fraction of capital K allocated to the consumption good 
sector, a predetermined initial level of capital stock and the tax regime.  Initial capital stock K(0) 
is the same in both tax regimes, whereas the initial consumption and the economic growth rate 
along a BGP both respond to tax regimes and thus, may be different in a different tax regime.    
 Under an earmarking tax regime,  
  110 (1 )[ (1 ) ] * (0);C u u s K
ααθ θτ τ −−= − −  
  1 1{(1 )(1 ) }.g σ τ β φ δ ρ= − − − −   
 Alternately, under a general-fund tax regime, 
  
[1 (1 )](1 ) (1 )(1 )
2 20 1(1 ) * (1 *) (0);C s s K
β η α α θ β
φ φτ − − − − −= − Φ −  
  
(1 )
2*1 2 1 *{(1 )(1 ) ( ) }.
s
sg
α ηβ
φσ τ β δ ρ
−
−= − − Φ − −    
 To compare the level of welfare between these two regimes, we quantitatively assess the 
discounted lifetime utility as follows.  First, we calibrate the model based upon the following 
parameter values representative of the economy in the US and consistent with a 2% long-run real 
economic growth rate.  The total tax revenues in the US, on average, account for 20% of its GDP 
after 1980, and hence τ=0.2 is chosen.  Following Turnovsky (2000), we choose the degree of the 
externality of public goods at α=β=0.08.  For the time preference rate, we set ρ=0.025 in 
accordance with Benhabib and Perli (1994).  Following Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993), we 
choose the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution at σ=2 and the depreciation rate at 
δ=0.05.  An equal share of inputs in the public good production is chosen (θ=η=0.5) for simplicity.  
Similarly, an equal share in the allocation of tax revenues is set (u=v=0.5).   
 Using the above parameter values, we calibrate the productivity coefficient in Sector Y and 
obtain a=0.2179 under an earmarking regime and a=0.2064 under a general-fund regime.  We 
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must point out that the resulting calibrated value for a is insensitive to different values of θ, η, u 
and v.  These benchmark parameter values are summarized in Table 1.  We normalize the value 
of predetermined initial capital at K(0)=1.  Under the set of benchmark parameter values, the 
unique BGP in earmarking taxes is {s*=0.32, C0=0.2095, g=0.02} and the level of welfare along 
the BGP is U1=-66.  There are two BGPs in general-fund taxes: {s1*=0.01, C0=0.0078, g=0.0108} 
and {s2*=0.40, C0=0.2662, g=0.0196}.  While the level of welfare at the former BGP is U1=-3508, 
the level of welfare at the latter BGP is U1=-44.  The former BGP is a sink and the latter is a 
saddle.  Thus, in the long run equilibrium paths almost surely converge to the former BGP.  The 
level of welfare along the BGP in general-fund taxes is U1=-3508 with the probability at 1.  As a 
result, the level of welfare along the BGP in a general-fund tax regime is lower than that in an 
earmarked tax regime.   
  [Insert Table 1 here] 
    To see how robust our above results are, we also simulate the model and compare the welfare 
between the two regimes in different sets of parameter values.  We find that our above results hold 
true in the following parameter space:  ρ∈[0.02, 0.05], δ∈[0.05, 0.20], σ∈[1.5, 7], θ∈[0.01, 0.99], 
η∈[0.01, 0.99], α∈[0.01, 0.20] and β∈[0.01, 0.20].  The range of parameter space is sufficiently 
large and parameter values are plausible.  This indicates that our results are robust. 
 
4.2 Utility Enhancing Public Goods 
 Along the BGP, the discounted lifetime utility in (16) is written as 
  1 2 22 (1 )[ ( 1)(1 ) ] (1 ) ,gU σ ρ σ γ σ ρ
Ω +Ω
− + − + −= −    (22) 
where Ω1≡(CX0GX0γ )(1-σ) and Ω1≡(CY0GY0γ )(1-σ) are composites of initial consumption of private and 
public goods.   
 Under an earmarking regime,  
  1 (1 )1 {(1 ) * (0)[ (1 ) * (0)] } ;s K u u s Kθ θ γ στ τ− −Ω = − −   
1*1 (1 ) ( 1) (1 ) 1 (1 )
2 1 *{(1 ) * (0)[ ( (1 ) (1 ) ) ] } [ (1 ) (1 *) (0)] ;
s
ss K a u u v v v v a s Kσθ θ η η γ σ σ η η γ στ τ− − − − − − − −−Ω = − − − − −
        1( 1) [ (1 ) ].g aσ γ σ τ δ ρ+ −= − − −  
 Alternately, under a general-fund regime, 
  1 (1 )1 {(1 ) * (0)[( * ) [ (1 *) ] (0)] } ;s K s u a s v Kθ θ γ στ τ− −Ω = − −     
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1*1 (1 ) ( ) ( 1) (1 )
2 1 *
1 (1 )
{(1 ) * (0)[ [ (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ] ] }
            {[ *(1 )] [ (1 *)(1 )} (0)} ;
s
ss K a u v u v
s u a s v K
σθ θ η η θ η γ σ σ
η η γ σ
τ
τ
− − − − − − −
−
− −
Ω = − − −
× − − −  
  1( 1) [ (1 ) ].g aσ γ σ τ δ ρ+ −= − − −  
 We continue to use the benchmark parameter values in Table 1 except for the factor share of 
public goods in production, α and β.  Following Turnovsky (2000), we choose the intensity of 
public goods consumption on the preference relative to private consumption at γ=0.3.  We then 
calibrate the productivity coefficient in Sector Y and obtain a=0.1512 in both tax regimes.  See 
Table 2 for benchmark parameter values used.  Under the set of benchmark parameter values and 
the normalized value of predetermined initial capital at K(0)=1, the unique BGP in earmarking 
taxes is {s*=0.24, Ω1=15.94, Ω2=60.78, g=0.02} and the level of welfare along the BGP is 
U2=-1424.  Alternatively, in general-fund taxes the unique BGP is {s*=0.10, Ω1=47.51, 
Ω2=122.17, g=0.02} and the level of welfare along the BGP U2=-3247.  Thus, the level of welfare 
along the BGP in a general-fund tax regime is lower than that in an earmarked tax regime.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
    Finally, we also simulate the model and compare the welfare in the two tax regimes in 
different sets of parameter values in order to examine the robustness of the above results.  We find 
that our results hold true in a wide range of parameter space as follows: ρ∈[0.02, 0.05], δ∈[0.05, 
0.20], σ∈[1.5, 7], θ∈[0.01, 0.99], η∈[0.01, 0.99] and γ∈[0.01, 1.5].  This indicates that the level 
of welfare in a general-fund tax regime is lower than the level of welfare in an earmarked tax 
regime.     
  
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 Extensive discussion has been had concerning the pros and cons of earmarking and general 
fund in conventional wisdom.  This paper evaluates the implications of desirability of earmarked 
tax and general fund financed tax based on aggregate economic stabilization.  We use a simple 
growth model with two sectors to illustrate the implications.   
 We find that regardless of the nature of public goods, earmarked taxes contribute to aggregate 
stabilization, while general fund financing may be destabilizing and thus causing economic 
fluctuations unrelated to economic fundamentals.  An earmarked tax generates sector-specific 
externalities that are too small to exert destabilizing forces.  General fund financing taxes, 
however, create intersectoral externalities and strategic complementarities that may be large enough 
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so that it is prone to indeterminacy of equilibrium, thereby generating persistent and recurring 
fluctuations in aggregate activities in the absence of shocks to fundamentals.  We also quantify the 
model and compare the level of welfare along a BGP in these two tax regimes.  Our results reveal 
that under plausible parameter values, the level of welfare along a BGP in an earmarked tax regime 
is higher that in a general-fund tax regime.  Thus, our results are robust to the nature of public 
goods.  Our results support the use of earmarked taxing against general fund financing based on 
aggregate stabilization in transitional dynamics and level of welfare in the long run.   
 Let us point out three possible limitations found in our paper.  First, the earmarked tax is like 
a user fee for the public input or service.13  When firms in each sector pay taxes and receive public 
input or service, the external effect of public goods is internalized.  As a result, the BGP in an 
earmarked tax is always determinate.  In a similar fashion in a general fund financing regime, if 
the government is able to charge firms in different sectors the marginal cost for the public service, 
intersectoral externalities as produced by public services are fully internalized.  Then, we expect 
the BGP to be determinate in the general fund financing regime.  If, however, the government is 
not be able to charge the marginal cost for public services, which is the case in practice, the BGP is 
indeterminate in a general fund financing regime. 
 Second, other than the two-sector model of pure consumption and pure investment goods 
used in our paper, another popular two-sector, endogenous growth model is the Lucas (1988) model.  
This type of model has been extended by Benhabib and Perli (1994), Bond, et al. (1996), Mino 
(1996), Benhabib, etal (2000), Ben-Gad (2003) and Chen and Lee (2007).  In this type of 
two-sector model, there is not only physical capital but also human capital.  The human capital 
sector uses a production technology to produce pure investment goods.  In Appendix B, we extend 
our model to take into account of human capital accumulation.  We find that equilibrium paths are 
determinate in both kinds of taxing regimes.  Such a result is consistent with the finding in Chen 
and Lee (2007).  Chen and Lee (2007) have shown that in a two-sector Lucas model when 
productive public capital is introduced, equilibrium paths are always determinate unless there is a 
congestion effect in the use of public services.  Thus, our conclusion in favor of earmarked taxes 
in terms of economic stability is applicable to the environment where labor cannot be used to form 
human capital.   
 Finally, we have assumed a given tax rate and thus public goods are not provided in an 
optimal fashion.  We abstract from an optimal provision of public goods in order for analytical 
                                                     
13 We thank an anonymous referee for bring this point to out attentions.   
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tractability.  In Appendix C we consider a benevolent government that chooses its first-best policy 
in the provision of public goods, given the production technology and resource constraints.  We 
have shown that in earmarked taxes, the optimal public good provision in each sector is a fixed 
proportion of the output produced in each sector.  As a result, the dynamic stability properties of 
the BGP in earmarked taxes are the same as those analyzed in the text and equilibrium paths are 
determinate.  In general-fund financing taxes, however, optimal provisions of the two types of 
public goods are very nonlinear functions of consumption and the shadow price of capital.  There 
are thus four more conditions.  The dynamic stability conditions are thus a 5x5 system, including 
the dynamic evolution of the fraction of capital allocated to the consumption sector analyzed in the 
text and these four additional conditions.  It is impossible to analyze the dynamic stability in this 
5x5 system unless the model is further simplified.  As a result, we cannot be sure if a general-fund 
financing regime is more destabilized when public goods are optimally provided.  Nevertheless, 
this may provide an interesting avenue for further research.  
 
Appendix 
A.  Proof of indeterminacy in general fund financing taxes in Section 2.2. 
 In analyzing transitional dynamics in general fund financing taxes in the model of production 
enhancing public goods, denote Σ as the parameter space.  Using σ=1+ρ/δ as a threshold, we split 
Σ into the following two subsets. 
{ }1 |1 1 ,ρδβ σ≡ Σ∈ − < < +Σ Σ  
{ }(1 ) (1 )1 12 212 2|1 and ( 1)[(1 ) (1 ) ] .β α β αφ φρδ σ σ σ τ β β δ ρ− −−≡ Σ∈ + ≤ ≥ − − Φ − − >Σ Σ  
 The dynamic stability of the system ( )s s=Λ&  in (13) depends upon the signs of M(s) and Δ(s) 
and is investigated as follows.  
Case 1.  Unique BGP   
 This case arises for all parameters in Σ1 and results in a unique BGP, s*.   
 As M(s)>(resp. <)0 if 2 1
1
( 1) (1 ) (1 )ˆ( . ) 1 ,s resp s σ α β β ασφ
− − − −< > ≡ −  we may divide set Σ1 into two 
mutually exclusive subsets as follows 
{ }*11 ˆ|1 1  and s ,sρδβ σ≡ Σ∈ − < < + <Σ Σ  
{ }*12 ˆ|1 1  and .s sρδβ σ≡ Σ∈ − < < + >Σ Σ  
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 When the parameter subspace is Σ11, then the slope of ( )s s= Λ&  is positive at s*.  The 
trajectory in the neighborhood of the unique BGP s* diverges from s* and thus s* is a saddle. 
 Alternatively, when the relevant subspace is Σ12, the slope of ( )s s= Λ&  is negative at s*, and 
thus the BGP is a sink.   
 Thus, the feasibility of local indeterminacy under Σ1 requires * ˆs s>  and ˆ 1.s <  
 First, condition * ˆs s>  requires 2 1
2
( 1) (1 ) (1 )*
1 ˆ( ) 1 ,s s
σ α β β α
σφβ − − − −> ≡ −  where 
*
1
1
( )s β
β
∂
∂ >  or <0.  
Under a given degree of intersectoral externalities in Sector Y, β1, the requirement is a minimal 
degree of intersectoral externalities in Sector X,       
*
1 2 1 1
*
1 1
(1 ) (1 )(1 )[1 ( )]
2 ( 1)(1 ) [1 ( )]
.s
s
β α σ β α β
σ β σβ βα α − + − − −− − + −> ≡%  
 Next, condition ˆ 1s <  is met when 1
2
(1 )
(1 )1 .
β α
α βσ −−> +  If we combine with the conditions in Σ12, 
the requirement is again a minimal degree of intersectoral externalities in Sector X  
1 1
1
(1 )
2 ( 1)(1 ) .a
β α
σ β βα −− − +> ≡)  
 Combining the requirements for * ˆs s>  and ˆ 1,s <  under a given β1, the unique BGP is a 
sink if α2> max{ , }.α α)%    
Case 2.  Two BGPs 
 This case arises for all parameters in Σ2.  Denote the two BGPs as s1* and s2*, with s1*<s2*.  
 Then, Δ(s)>0 for s<s1* and s>s2*, and Δ(s)<0 for s in (s1*, s2*).  As the sign of M(s) depends 
upon whether s2* is larger or smaller than ˆ,s  we may separate Σ2 into two mutually exclusive 
subsets as follows 
{ }(1 ) (1 )1 11 11 *21 2 2 ˆ|  1 , ( 1)[(1 ) (1 ) ] and ,s sβ α β αφ φρδ σ σ τ β β δ ρ− −−≡ Σ∈ + ≤ − − Φ − − > <Σ Σ  
{ }(1 ) (1 )1 11 11 *22 2 2 ˆ|1 , ( 1)[(1 ) (1 ) ]  and  .s sβ α β αφ φρδ σ σ τ β β δ ρ− −−≡ Σ∈ + ≤ − − Φ − − > >Σ Σ  
 In the case where *2 ˆ,s s<  the relevant parameter subspace is Σ21 and the local dynamics are 
illustrated in Figure 3.  As M(s)>(resp. >)0 for all ˆ( . ) ,s resp s< >  it is evident that ( )s s= Λ&  is 
negatively (resp. positively) sloping at s1* (resp. s2*).  While BGP s2* is a saddle, BGP s1* is a sink. 
 Alternatively, for *2 ˆ,s s>  the relevant parameter subspace is Σ22.  Two situations emerge 
depending if s1* is larger than sˆ  (Figures 4 and 5).  It is apparent that BGP s1* is a saddle in 
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Figure 5 as ( )s s= Λ&  is positively sloping at s1*; however, s1* is a sink in Figure 4 as ( )s s= Λ&  is 
negatively sloping at s1*, like that in Figure 3.  BGP s2* is always a sink in both figures, 
as ( )s s= Λ&  is always negatively sloping around s2*.   
 
B.  An extension to include human Capital 
 If we consider human capital as another private input, our model may be modified as follows. 
The technologies in both sectors are 
  1( ) ( ) ,XX sK zH G
α ζ ζ α− −=     (B1a) 
  1[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] ,YY s K z H G
β ξ ξ β− −= − −  (B1b) 
where s and z are the fraction of physical capital, K, and human capital, H, respectively, allocated to 
Sector X, and ζ and ξ are respectively the contribution to the production in each sector.  While 
Sector X produces consumable investment goods, Sector Y produces human capital goods.  GX and 
GY are the provisions of public goods toward Sectors X and Y, with α and β being their contribution 
to the production, respectively.  
 For simplicity, we assume there is no depreciation for the stock of physical and human capital.  
The motions of the two kinds of capital stock for the representative agent are given by 
  (1 ) ,K X Cτ= − −&  (B2a) 
    (1 ) .H Yτ= −&  (B2b) 
 Given K(0), H(0), τ, u, v, and public goods, the representative agent’s problem is to choose C, 
s, z, K and H in order to maximize its discounted utility in (4), subject to the constraints in 
(B1a)-(B2b).  If we let λ(t) and μ(t) be the co-state variable associated with K(t) and H(t), 
respectively, then the necessary conditions are  
  ,C σ λ− =  (B3a) 
 1(1 ) (1 ) ,
X Y
s sλ α ζ μ β ξ −− − = − −  (B3b) 
 1 ,
X Y
z zλζ μξ −=  (B3c) 
 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ,X YK K
τ τλ α ζ μ β ξ λρ λ− −− − + − − = − &  (B3d) 
 (1 ) (1 ) ,X YH H
τ τλζ μξ μρ μ− −+ = − &  (B3e) 
together transversality conditions lim 0,tt e K
ρ λ−→∞ =  and lim 0.tt e Hρ μ−→∞ =   
 Condition (B3a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal cost, the shadow 
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price of physical capital, while (B3b) and (Bc) equate the marginal product of physical capital and 
human capital between the goods and the education sector.  Finally, (B3d) and (B3e) are the Euler 
equations governing the optimal accumulation for physical and human capital, respectively. 
   Finally, the government’s behavior is the same in the text.   
 Since the model is similar to Chen and Lee (2007), we may follow their dynamic analysis.  
We transform the economic system into the structure with variables {p, n, m}, where p≡μ/λ, n≡C/H, 
and m≡K/H.  First, from the Pareto complements in physical and human capital in the technology, 
we obtain 
  (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ,
s
s sz
α ζ ξ
α ζ ξ β ξ ζ
− −
− − + − − −=  (B4) 
with (1 )(1 )( ) 0.
s s
z zz s
−
−′ = >  
 If we utilize (B1a)-(B1b), (B4) and (6), we rewrite (B3b) as 
  /( )/[(1 ) ] .
X sK sK
Y z H zHp
ζ
ξ −=  (B5a)  
Under an earmarking regime, (B5a) can be rewritten as  
  
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
2
( )( ) ,s zz pm
ξ α ζ β ζ β ξ α
α β α βζξ
− − − − − −
− − − −ΔΔ =  (B5b) 
where 111 [ (1 ) ] ,u u
ααθ θτ −−Δ = − and 112 [ (1 ) ] .v v ββη ητ −−Δ = −   Notice that the above equation is 
similar to (9a) in Chen and Lee (2007).   
 Based on (B5b), it is easy to obtain z as a function of p and m and  
  (1 ) ,zzp p
ξ α ζ− − −∂
∂ Γ=  
  (1 ) [ (1 ) (1 )](1 )(1 ) ,
zz
m m
ξ α ζ ξ α ζ β
α β
− − − − −∂
∂ − − Γ=  
where 2[ (1 ) (1 )] 0.ξ α ζ βΓ = − − − >  
 Based on the Proposition 3 in Chen and Lee (2007, p. 2497), it is easy to show that the 
condition for indeterminacy is Γ<0.  However, Γ>0 under an earmarking regime, and thereby the 
equilibrium path toward the BGP is determinate.  
 Alternately, under general-fund regime, (B5a) can be rewritten as 
  
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
3 2 2 2 2
4
( ) ( )
1 ( ) 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ,
s z s zz
s z z z pm
α β θ α ηβ ξ α ζ β ζ β ξ α
φ φ φ φζξ
− − − − − − − − − −Δ
Δ − − − =   (B6) 
where 
1
2
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) 1 [1 (1 )] (1 )
3 (1 ){ (1 ) (1 ) [ ( )] ( ) } ;u v u v φ
ζ β ξαβ θ αβη θ αβ θ η θ θ α β η αξ θξ α ζτ τ − −− − − − − − − − −− −Δ = − −  
   
1
2
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )(1 )
4 (1 ){[ (1 ) (1 ) ] [ ( )] ( ) } .u v u v φ
ζ β ξη η β αθ θ θ αβη β ξ αθξ α ζτ τ − −− − − − − −− −Δ = − −  
 Equation (B6) also yields z as a function of p and m with  
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  2 (1 ) (1 ) ,z zzp p
φ ξ α ζ− − − −∂
∂ Γ=  
  (1 ) (1 )[ (1 ) (1 )] ,z zzm m
ξ α ζ ξ α ζ β− − − − − −∂
∂ Γ=  
where 2[ (1 ) (1 )] (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0.s zξ α ζ β α β θ ξ α ζ β α ηξ α ζΓ = − − − − + − − − − + − − − >  
Thus, the equilibrium path toward the BGP is determinate.   
 
C.  An extension when the government chooses public goods optimally   
 We assume the government is benevolent and choose its first-best policy in the provision of 
public goods, given production technology and resource constraints.  
(1) Earmarking financing 
 In an earmarking regime, using (5), (6), and (7) yields the following government budget 
constraints 
  (1 )(1 ) ,XX u u Gαθ α θτ − − −= −  (C1) 
  (1 )(1 ) .YY v v Gβη β ητ − − −= −  (C2) 
If we substitute (C1) and (C2) into (3a) and (3b), we obtain economy’s resource constraints. 
  (1 )(1 ) ,XX C u u G
αθ α θ− − −= + −  (C3) 
  (1 )(1 ) .YY K K v v G
βη β ηδ − − −= + + −&  (C4) 
 To determine the first-best policy, we need to solve the social planner’s problem.  The social 
planner’s problem is to choose C, s, K, GX, and GY in order to maximize the representative agent’s 
utility in (4), subject to production technologies (1a) and (1b) and the resource constraints in (B3) 
and (B4), taking K(0), u and v as given.  If we let μ(t) be the co-state variable associated with K(t), 
then the necessary conditions are combined into four equations and are as follows: 
  1(1 ) (1 ) ,
X Y
s sC σα μ β− −− = −  (C5) 
  (1 ) [(1 ) ] ,X YK KC σα μ β δ ρμ μ−− + − − = − &  (C6) 
  (1 ) 1(1 ) ,XGX u uαθ α θα ω−= − ≡  (C7) 
  (1 ) 2(1 ) .YGY v vηβ β ηβ ω−= − ≡  (C8) 
 The conditions for GX and GY are in (C7) and (C8) which indicate that public spending in each 
sector accounts for a fixed fraction of output produced in each sector.  If we substitute (C7) and 
(C8) into (1a) and (1b), the production functions are rewritten as follows. 
  11 ( ),X sK
ααω −=  (C9) 
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  12 [ (1 ) ].Y a s K
β
βω −= −  (C10) 
 It is obvious that the production functions are of an AK form with the production coefficient 
in proportion to a fixed fraction of optimal public good provisions in each sector.  The dynamic 
stability in this economy remains characterized by (11).  As a result, under an optimal public 
provision, the equilibrium path toward BGP is determinate in earmarked financing 
(2) General fund financing 
 For a general-fund regime, using (5), (6), and (7) yields the following government budget 
constraints 
  
1(1 ) (1 )
1[ ] ,X YX G G η θ
η θτ −− − −= Δ  (C9) 
  
1
2[ ] ,X YY G G η θη θτ −−= Δ  (C10) 
where 
1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
1 1[ (1 ) ( ) ] ;
v
vu u η θθ η η θ θ η −− − − − −−Δ = −  
1(1 ) (1 )
2 1[ (1 ) ( ) ] .
u
uv v η θη θ θ η θη −− − − −−Δ = −   
 If we substituting (C9) and (C10) into (3a) and (3b), the economy’s resource constraints are: 
  
1(1 ) (1 )
1[ ] ,X YX C G G η θ
η θ −− − −= + Δ  (C11) 
  
1
2[ ] .X YY K K G G η θ
η θδ −−= + + Δ&  (C12) 
 The social planner’s problem is to choose C, s, K, GX, and GY in order to maximize the 
representative agent’s utility in (4), subject to technology (1a) and (1b) and resource constraints in 
(C11) and (C12), taking as given K(0), u and v.  If we let μ(t) be the co-state variable associated 
with K(t), then the necessary conditions are combined into four equations and are as follows: 
  1(1 ) (1 ) ,
X Y
s sC σα μ β− −− = −  (C13) 
  (1 ) [(1 ) ] ,X YK KC σα μ β δ ρμ μ−− + − − = − &  (C14) 
  
1 11 2(1 ) (1 ) (1 )[ ( ) ] [ ] ,X Y X YC X G G G Gη θ η θ
η ηη θ η θσ η θ η θα μ− −− Δ Δ− − − −− − −+ =  (C15) 
  
1 11 2(1 ) (1 ) (1 )[ ] [ ( ) ],X Y X YC G G Y G Gη θ η θ
θ θη θ η θσ η θ η θμ β− −− Δ Δ− − − −− − −= +  (C16) 
with the transversality condition lim 0.tt e K
ρ μ−→∞ =  
 Equations (C15) and (C16) are, respectively, the optimal conditions for GX and GY.  These 
two conditions determine GX and GY but unlike in earmarked taxes, there are no closed-form 
expressions.  Both GX and GY are each a nonlinear function of C and μ.  As the dynamics of μ is 
governed by (B14), through which the dynamics of C are influenced.  Given these conditions, the 
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dynamic stability in the general-fund financing taxes is determined by a 5x5 system including (13) 
and (C13)-(C16).  Finally, it is impossible to analyze the dynamic stability in this 5x5 system.  
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Table 1: Benchmark parameter values in economy with production-enhancing public goods 
 
 
Table 2: Benchmark parameter values in economy with utility-enhancing public goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth rate τ δ ρ σ θ=η u=v α=β a (earmarking) a (general fund) 
0.02 0.2 0.05 0.025 2 0.5 0.5 0.08 0.2179 0.2064 
Growth rate τ δ ρ σ θ=η u=v γ a 
0.02 0.2 0.05 0.025 2 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1512 
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Figure 1: Existence of BGPs in General Fund Financing Taxes 
          
Figure 2:  Unique BGP is a sink:  Σ∈Σ12. 
    
 
Figure 3:  BGP s1* is a sink:  Σ∈Σ21 
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Figure 4:  BGP s1* and s2* are sinks:  Σ∈Σ22 
 
 
Figure 5:  BGP s2* is a sink:  Σ∈Σ22 
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